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The present article argues that the Doing Business indicators, their legitimacy (their 
ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from standards), and 
the wider notions of legitimacy (the standards) that they promulgate are all best 
understood as social, or better still, ÔeconosociolegalÕ constructions. It tracks their, 
primarily post-financial crisis, re-co-construction within and beyond the World Bank 
from servant of the private sector and discipliner of states, to something approaching 
social champion. But it warns that the perceptions of legitimacy that have been 
generated by those indicators may well linger.  
Introduction 
This article starts from the interrelated premises that (a) legitimacy and standards are 
mutually constitutive (b) legitimacy and standards are co-constructed through social 
actions, interactions and regimes, in the context of prevailing rationalities and (c) co-
constructions are necessarily provisional and contingent, and therefore subject to re-
co-construction, in particular as rationalities shift. It explores the validity and 
implications of these premises through one set of standards, the Doing Business 
indicators, which have been produced and distributed by the World Bank since 2004 
to measure the roles played by state legal systems in business life around world, with 
special reference to the implications for economic development 
Legitimacy, as commonly defined, is constructed with reference to rules/standardsÑ
specifically (a) compliance with rules/standards or (b) the ability to be defended 
through some logic or justification arising from rules/standards.2  
                                                
1  Professor of Law, Kent Law School a.perry-kessaris@kent.ac.uk 
@aperrykessaris and https://econosociolegal.wordpress.com. Sincere thanks to the 
editors and an anonymous reviewer for their comments. 
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Socio-legal specialists are particularly well-versed in exposing the socially-
constructed and, therefore, contingent and provisional nature of all standards, of their 
implementation, and of their legitimacy. Sociologically-informed approaches seek to 
Ôconsistently and permanently address[es] the need to reinterpret law systematically 
and empirically as a social phenomenonÕ (Cotterrell 1998, p. 183). So we users of 
such approaches are ever-attuned to the facts that inside every standard there lurks 
a debate, and that any standard can be abused or avoided. So well do we know 
these facts about the social life of standards, that we risk taking them for granted, 
forgetting their origin, becoming blas as to their enduring significance.  
Indeed, it is instructive to remember that there remain all manner of standards by 
which sociolegal specialists remain blindly persuaded, of whose social life we remain 
entirely ignorant. For example, a recent object-based enquiry caused me to notice 
the quietly forceful rule/standard commonly engraved on, materially embedded in, 
metallic measuring devices (in this case, a caliper): ÔSTANDARD at 20¼Õ. Further 
investigation revealed that this international standard reference temperature for 
dimensional measurements was established after fierce debate at a time when the 
temperature scale was itself Ôunder serious studyÕ (Dorion 2007 pp. 2-3. See also 
Perry-Kessaris 2016). The setting of this as the standard had a radical, on-going 
effect on the physical sciences that rarely-to-never crosses most minds (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, as the bent caliper pin pictured in Figure 1 reminds us, even agreed 
physical standards are always subject to abuse and avoidance.  
All of this is to say that, repetitive though they may sometimes feel, exposs of the 
social life of rules/standards, in particular of the intertwined stories of their legitimacy 
and re-co-construction, remain a crucial sociolegal enterprise.  
[Figure 1: The contingency of standards about here]  
The present article argues that the Doing Business indicators, their legitimacy (their 
ability to be defended through some logic or justification arising from standards), and 
                                                                                                                                       
2  Legitimacy includes Ôconformity to rule or principle, or to sound reasoning.Õ To 
be legitimate is to be Ôconformable to law or rule; lawful, properÉNormal, regular; 
conformable with a standard type.ÕThe Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles Volume I. Clarendon Press, Oxford.1977. For other variations of 
the notion legitimacy, including those with more specific technical application see 
also Nelken & Siems. 
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the wider notions of legitimacy (the standards) that they promulgate are all best 
understood as social, or better still, ÔeconosociolegalÕ constructions. I use this 
ungainly term to highlight the facts that Ôthe economy and the law are mutually 
constitutive, and that both are in turn mutually constitutive of wider social life, 
including that part of social life relating to how we think and communicate aboutÕ the 
economic and the legal (Perry-Kessaris 2015 and 2014).  
This entanglement is especially significant given that the Doing Business indicators 
are produced and consumed in a development assistance context which sees people 
Ôover hereÕ defining how people Ôover thereÕ ought to think and communicate about 
the economic and the legal. Because indicators are socially constructed they are 
contingent and provisional, and therefore stand to be re-evaluated and re-constructed. 
But as a technology of governance they are subject to narrow control and vested 
interests. 
This article shows the legitimacy of the Doing Business indicators and the legitimacy 
that they seek to confer on state legal systems have been intensely contested, 
resulting in their on-going re-co-construction.   
Construction 
An indicator is a named collection of rank ordered data that purports to represent the 
past or projected performance of some aspect of social (including economic and 
legal) life. It is useful to visualise the construction of indicators, and their legitimacy, 
as occurring in four stages, each of which is visualised in Figure 2: scanning, 
isolation, conversion and communication. At every stage of the process, actions and 
interactions are influenced by the dominant rationalities and resulting regimes. 
[Figure 2: Constructing indicators about here] 
When we construct an indicator, we scan social life to identify traces of the actions 
and interactions that appear, in the context of our specific rationality, to be important. 
Any of a wide range of rationalities or Ôways of apprehending the worldÕ (Dryzek 2005, 
p. 2) might inform our understanding of what is ÔimportantÕ. The ÔimportantÕ traces are 
then isolated and grouped according to what they are seen to represent. So for 
example the Doing Business focuses primarily on traces (records of time, cost, 
number of steps) relating to specific (inter)actions of/between commercial actors and 
judges or bureaucrats. Next the grouped traces are converted, through economic, 
mathematical and governance regimes, into named indicators. Finally, the indicator is 
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ready to be communicated within the inward and outward facing regimes or systems 
of the producer and then beyond as it is distributed to and consumed by, others.  For 
example, the Doing Business indicators are produced and consumed by the World 
Bank, which then also distributes them for consumption by states, commentators and 
commercial actors.  
Legitimacy through indicators 
Once in circulation, indicators offer a standard against which to measure legal 
systems. For example the Doing Business indicators are aggregated into an Ôease of 
doing business indexÕ which ranks states and regions within them, thereby 
constructing the statesÕ international reputation and, thereby, the terms on which it 
accesses technical and financial development assistance, which in turn triggers 
annual ministerial handwringing across the globe.3 
                                                
3  Jason Yackee (2016) has criticized sociolegal commentators, and me 
specifically, of making over-blown, under-evidenced and ÔprovocativeÕ claims as to 
the influence that the Doing Business indicators may have on the disbursement of aid 
(pp. 178, 179, 180 and 182). In fact my research in this field has primarily focused 
not (as Jackee suggests) on the direct impact of DB indicators on aid volume, but 
rather on the more diffuse and potentially pernicious roles played by indicators in 
stimulating and rewarding competition between states and regions to rise in Doing 
Business rankings (Perry-Kessaris 2008b and 2011) and of spreading what I have 
termed the Ôinvestment climate discourseÕ (Perry-Kessaris, 2008), of which indicators 
form a part, in World Bank and client-state policy-making; as well as on the lack of 
evidence in support of the World BankÕs contention that investors are at all motivated 
by Doing Business rankings (Perry-Kessaris 2001, 2003, 2008a and 2011). It 
certainly has not, as Yackee suggests (2016 194) be done without Ômuch thought 
given toward how to testÕ my hypotheses. But it has been primarily, intentionally and 
unapologetically qualitative. YackeeÕs own quantitative analysis suggested that his 
chosen measures of Bank and multilateral aid were Ôassociated withÕ his chosen 
measures of DB-focused reform efforts, which is in keeping with the observations 
made by me and other qualitative researchers. But he notes that Ôwe should also be 
careful not to exaggerate the apparent relevance of Doing Business to aid.Õ I agree 
and have paid special attention to the wording of the above paragraph to reflect that. 
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In addition to the more active roles that it plays in stimulating competition and 
directing conditional funding, a legal system indicator also acts as a placeholder. A 
placeholder is Ôa technique for working with and in the meantimeÕÑfor pragmatic and 
other reasons (Riles 2011, pp. 173). It fulfils the human need to set our awareness of 
contingency and provisionality to the side. The indicator functions as a placeholder 
for underlying, provisional and contingent, aspects of real social (including economic) 
life. Its form, whether presented raw as digits or visualised in a chart, is akin to a 
snapshot. So it is that many of Susan SontagÕs (1977) foundational and unsettling 
observations on photography have an unexpected resonance for the understanding 
of indicators.  
Sontag notes that photographs, and we might say indicators, are inherently value- 
and meaning-less. The indicator/snapshot presents a world that is at once 
simplistically ÔatomicÕ and therefore accessible, composed of separate images 
without ÔinterconnectednessÕ or ÔcontinuityÕ; and at the same time mysteriously 
ÔopaqueÕ (Sontag 1977, p. 23). Consequently, snapshot/indicators Ôwhich cannot 
themselves explain anything, are inexhaustible invitations to deduction, speculation 
and fantasyÕ (Sontag 1977, p. 23). They produce Ôknowledge at bargain pricesÑa 
semblance of wisdom; as the act of taking pictures is a semblance of appropriationÕ 
(Sontag 1977 p. 24). For example, despite its grand title, the Ôenforcing contractsÕ 
indicator produced by the Doing Business regime refers only to judicial-based 
enforcement. Yet it is a treated as placeholder for, or snapshot of, the reliability of 
commercial interactions generally.4 This Ôsemblance of appropriationÕ also visible at 
the country level. For example, (Figure 3) Cyprus is a post-colonial, post-conflict, 
post-financial crisis, ethnically divided, partially occupied island located on the 
periphery of the European Union that specialises in tourism and financial services. 
What of that is/not captured in this snapshot? What ought to be? 
[Figure 3: Snapshot of Cyprus about here] 
To some extent the very generation of a snapshot/indicator itself confirms the 
significance, perhaps as a source of legitimacy, of the thing that is being captured by 
it. As Sontag put it, Ôan event has come to mean, precisely, something worth 
photographingÕ (1977 p. 18). So there is a degree of self-referential circularity to the 
                                                
4  These are often, erroneously, seen as being best when they are motivated 
purely by purpose, the task at hand. 
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relationship between legitimacy and indicators. But ultimately Ôideology (in the 
broadest sense) É determines what constitutes an eventÕ (Sontag 1977, pp.18-19). 
As Dani Rodrik argued in relation to models, what makes a snapshot/indicator 
Ôindispensable, when used well, is that it captures the most relevant aspect of reality 
in a given contextÕ (2015 p. 11). The context or raison dÕetre of indicators/snapshots 
always lies beyond them. Indeed, a 2008 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
report included a section entitled Ôideas behind the indicatorsÕ. As these ideas or 
rationalities change, the circle of legitimacy is broken and the indicators come under 
pressure. Throughout the process of co-construction the rationalities that underpin an 
indicator, and therefore it legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy that it seeks to confer, 
may be aligned or at odds with other rationalities. 
Legitimacy of indicators 
The Doing Business indicators can be seen as part of a wider ÔcampaignÕ, the 
purpose of which has been to benchmark national and sub-national Ôinvestment 
climatesÕ, setting development standards in and through the process (Perry-Kessaris 
2011). That campaign has been driven by a yet broader phenomenon which Fine and 
Milonakis have termed Ôeconomics imperialismÕ (2008). So the Doing Business 
regime marketizes national legal systems, treating them Ôas ifÕ they were (solely) 
Ôcommodities competing for the attentions of foreign investorsÕ; and seeks to 
numericise legal systems to render them accessible to mathematization, the 
analytical method of choice for mainstream economics (Perry-Kessaris 2011 p. 417).  
Although the Doing Business regime affects all of social (including economic and 
legal) life, it constructs legitimacy in and through the rationalities and regimes of 
ÔorthodoxÕ or ÔmainstreamÕ economics. This is troubling because economics--Ôthe only 
social science that remains almost entirely impenetrable to those who have not 
undertaken the requisite apprenticeship in graduate schoolÕ (Rodrik 2015, p. 31).  
The dominance of economics is methodologically contentious because it is closed to 
non-specialists, including lawyers. The Doing Business indicators are often praised 
and given legitimacy on the basis of their methodological transparency (IEG 2008 p. 
xvi, 2015 overview, 2016 overview). But that transparency is only as valuable as the 
scrutiny it facilitates. It is likely that the quantitative and econo-centric focus of the 
indicators exclude potential critics from investigating. Furthermore, and perhaps 
never more than in 2016, there may be more fun and splash to be had from working 
with data sources than from questioning them.  
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The dominance of economics is normatively contentious because economics has in 
recent decades been exceptionally narrow, offering universal prescriptions centering 
on stabilization, privatization and liberalization, especially in the context of 
development assistance (Rodrik 2015, 167).  
It is useful to consider these two strands of contention in the context of Max WeberÕs 
typology of rationalities: pragmatic, value-based, theoretical and rule-based.5 Of less 
immediate relevance in the present context are pragmatic rationalities, which guide 
expediency, and value-based rationalities, which guide taste and morality. Indicators 
tend instead to be a function of theoretical and formal rationalities, the former 
exerting a heavy influence on the latter which is often under acknowledged especially 
in the pseudo-neutral context of development assistance.  
Theoretical rationalities are grounded in Ôa conscious mastery of reality through the 
construction of increasingly precise and abstract conceptsÕ (Kalberg 1980, p. 1152). 
Such concepts are often framed by academic approaches or schools of thought, such 
as law or economics. Rule-based rationalities are grounded in the regimes that 
govern economic, legal and scientific spheres (Kalberg 1980, p. 1158 cited in Perry-
Kessaris 2015, p. 4). For example, the Doing Business indicators and other Ôgood 
governance and rule of lawÕ indicators are widely used across jurisdiction and sector 
as a Ôtechnology of governanceÕ (Davis et al. 2010) to force a convergence on 
particular types of new legal standards and processes. That technology operates by 
a combination of economic (e.g. inter-state competition) and legal (e.g. loan 
conditionality) regimes. But those regimes are in turn grounded in the theoretical 
rationalities favoured by their creators. In the case of the Doing Business indicators 
those rationalities have been drawn from the market-oriented theory of neoliberal 
economics and have consequently emphasised that legal systems ought above all 
else to be efficient and predictable so as to reduce burdens on the private sector. 
Because the Doing Business indicators are high-profile, long-standing and have far-
reaching consequences, it is unsurprising that their legitimacy has been subject to 
challenge by opposing, and shifting, rationalities and regimes from outside (See 
Perry-Kessaris 2008 and Arrunada 2009 for examples).  
                                                
5  These four types were originally identified by Max Weber as practical, 
theoretical, substantive, and formal respectively (Kalberg 1980, p. 1147).  
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Re-co-construction 
The legitimacy of the Doing Business indicators has also been subjected to three 
rounds of intensive, formal scrutiny from within the World Bank: the Independent 
Evaluation Group Report (2008) the introduction of the Oversight Process for 
Ranking Indicators (2010) and the Independent Panel Report (2013). Each challenge 
has contributed to a slow, on-going, re-co-construction of the indicators, of their 
legitimacy and of the legitimacy that they seek to confer on state legal systems. 
Overtime the focus of these challenges has shifted between two interconnected 
threads. The methodological thread, grounded in formal rationalities off science, of 
how to measure Ôease of doing businessÕ in a development context, has increasingly 
given way to a normative thread, grounded in theoretical rationalities, of why one 
ought to do so.  
 
Scientific legitimacy 
The first formal institutional challenge to the Doing Business regime came from the 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), a body established by the World Bank Group to 
offer independent scrutiny of the development effectiveness of the World Bank Group. 
In 2008 the IEG conducted the first comprehensive evaluation of the Doing business 
regime, which was then in its fourth year. It reviewed the underlying rationale, 
methodology, relevance and usage (inside and outside the Bank) of Doing Business 
indicators.  
The IEG suggested that the Doing Business indicators have been Ôhighly effective in 
drawing attention to the burdens of business regulationÕ (IEG 2008, p. xv). But that 
achievement in communication is best read as a failure, because their legitimacy was 
found to be weak: they are measuring the wrong things, badly. The report noted a 
lack of methodological transparency; a reliance on thin data sets; an ideological bias 
in data selection; and a failure to monitor the impact of indicators with a view to 
making any necessary adjustments--what we might call Ôre-scanningÕ (IEG 2008, p. 
xiii). So the Doing Business regime Ôidentifies countries as reformersÕÑas 
placeholders for what it means to be successfulÑÔbased on changes in country 
rankings, without regard to the relevance and quality of the reformÕ; or to whether 
those reforms have actually implemented (IEG 2008, p. 45 and 46). Nor is there a 
Ôclear articulation of the impactÕ of the reforms measured by the Doing Business 
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regime Ôon firm performance, perceptions of regulatory burden, or the overall 
regulatory environment in a countryÕ (IEG 2008 p. 46).  
These methodological critiques were responded to in the second institutional 
challenge came in 2010 when the World Bank introduced of a new Oversight 
Process for Ranking Indicators. This Ôcorporate framework for oversight and quality 
controlÕ promised to subject Ônew products and associated indicatorsÕ to a five-stage 
review procedure. Furthermore, any existing ÔproductsÕ which had not undergone 
Ôextensive external and internal evaluations processesÕ were also open to reviewed. 
The ÔbackgroundÕ explanatory narrative offered at the time for the introduction of the 
Process pointed to problems of quantity over quality, and form over function. It 
focused in part on the Ôreputational risk associated with the robustness of the 
methodologyÕÑthat is, legitimacy of what we might call the scanning, isolation and 
organization elements of the indicator construction. It also questioned the legitimacy 
of ranking as a development tool per se (World Bank, 29 November 2010): 
 ÔOver the years, the Bank has produced a variety of indicators, which provide 
the basis (explicitly or implicitly) for cross-country rankings, primarily of 
government policies, regulations and actions. Several of these indicators have 
been quite useful in benchmarking countries, catalyzing dialogue about 
reforms, and providing incentives for countries to improve performance. The 
process of preparation and publication of indicators has however been 
subject to different degrees of internal oversight, raising concerns about 
possible reputational risk associated with the robustness of the methodology, 
the consistency with the BankÕs development mandate, and the 
communication process leading to their publicationÕ (World Bank, 29 
November 2010 quoted in Perry-Kessaris 2011, p. 416). 
In 2012, an Independent Panel was appointed by World Bank Group President Jim 
Yong Kim to investigate the Doing Business regime (IP 2013), partly in response to 
Chinese objections to that the reports had consistently awarded it a low ranking 
(Harding 2013). The formation of the Independent Panel sparked external protests, in 
particular from liberal-leaning economists who issued an S.O.S to save the indicators, 
complete with a dedicated email address helpdoingbusinessreport@gmail.com at 
which to register support for the indicators (Khan 2013). An open letter was received 
from five leading economists making the case for retaining the indicators, a core, not 
compelling, argument of which was that criticism is the indicators is a measure of 
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their power (Acemoglu et al. 2013, p. 1). The proceedings of the Panel were the 
subject of such frenetic attention that the Panel issued a statement asking that it be 
allowed to work in peace.6  
The 2013 Panel questioned the legitimacy of the Doing Business indicators on the 
same two grounds as the 2008 report: legitimacy of the methodology, and legitimacy 
of ranking in a development context. For example, the Panel criticised the failure to 
enable the measurement of errors in data collection and analysis, and problematized 
the use of aggregate rankings and hypothetical case studies. Most important, it found 
Ôno scientific evidence for the reportÕs current selection of indicatorsÕ. The snapshot 
was both out of focus and poorly cropped (Independent Panel, 2013, pp. 5 and 22-4).  
The Independent Panel put into question the overall legitimacy of the indicators by 
recommending a future of Ôrobust oversight, governance and reviewÕ and specified 
that those Ôtasks should not be left to the Doing Business teamÕ since, as any lawyer 
or economist will tell you, Ôit cannot operate as both principal and agentÕ (Independent 
Panel, 2013, p. 33). It argued that in order Ôto be consistent with the BankÕs overall 
philosophy [the Doing Business regime] needs to empower and enable countries in 
their quest to develop their own reform programmesÕ (2013, p. 10 see also p. 3). It 
also identified as significant the near total lack of connection with other sets of 
indicators produced by the Bank such as enterprise surveys (p. 4), and with the tone 
of other reports such as the World Development Report on the topic of labour 
regulation (p. 28).7 
                                                
6  Dated 03.05.13. Statement previously available at 
http://www.dbrpanel.org/sites/dbrpanel/files/Statement%20from%20the%20Independ
ent%20Panel%20Reviewing%20the%20Doing%20Business%20Report%20-
%20May%203,%202013.pdf This website has since been hijacked.  
7  For a detailed statistical analysis of disparities between the Doing Business 
surveys (which address the de jure legal environment) and the Enterprise surveys 
(which measure de facto legal environment) see Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 




The first decade of Doing Business Reports were explicitly focused on the objective 
of reducing the burden of regulation so that businesses and thereby, secondarily, the 
general population, might prosper. The source of indicator legitimacy was firmly and 
narrowly located with the economic needs of the private sector, from which the rest of 
society was expected indirectly to benefit. For example, the introduction to the first 
report, Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation, reads: 
A vibrant private sectorÑwith firms making investments, creating jobs, and 
improving productivityÑpromotes growth and expands opportunities for poor 
people. [This] is the first in a series of annual reports investigating the scope 
and manner of regulations that enhance business activity and those that 
constrain it (Doing Business Report 2004, p. viii).  
The 2008 report made two fairly tentative steps towards a normative critique of this 
emphasis on the private sector. First, it explicitly supported years of protest from civil 
society actors in noting that the Employing Workers Indicator wrongly focused 
exclusively on the costs of employment regulations to the employer, never on the 
benefits of those regulations to employees (IEG 2008 p. 33). From the next year, the 
Employing Workers Indicator was no longer referred to in the body of Doing Business 
Reports or in World Bank project work, although data were still collected (IP 2013, p. 
24).8 Second, it emphasized that the Doing Business indicators offer only a partial 
snapshot of the relevant factors and Ôcannot by themselves capture other key 
dimensions of a countryÕs business climate, the benefits of regulation, or key related 
aspects of development effectivenessÕ (IEG 2008, p. xv). The point was pressed 
further by the Director General of Evaluation in his summary of the proceedings of 
the Committee on Development Effectiveness meeting convened to discuss the 
Evaluation and the response to it of the Management Board of the World Bank. He 
specifically highlighted that the World Bank Group Ôhas the responsibility to 
emphasizeÕ not only the Ôimportance of efficiency in implementing regulationsÕ but 
also the Ôpotential value addedÕ of those regulations (IEG 2008 XXvi). Here we see 
the beginnings of the normative thread of critique relating to the obsessive focus on 
                                                
8  See also Doing Business (2009) ÔGuidance Note for World Bank Group Staff 




efficiency as a measure of legal system effectiveness which, although not addressed 
in the 2010 intervention, would surface again in 2013 and beyond. 
The 2013 Report went much deeper, challenging for the first time the core 
assumption the Doing Business regime that the private sector is the priority. It noted 
that the Doing Business regime Ôhas, rightly or wrongly become associated with a 
broad deregulation agendaÕ, and with the argument that Ôminimal regulation and very 
low taxes create the most attractive environment for businessÕ, when in fact, 
Ôregulation is necessary to protect societal and environmental interests, and taxes are 
necessary to provide public services and build infrastructureÕ (IP 2013 p. 11). 
Because Ôindicators should provide a balanced perspective that captures both the 
positive and negative aspects of regulationÕ, it was recommended that the Doing 
Business team Ôengage with the relevant experts to ascertain the most appropriate 
benchmarks and refresh the economic thinking behind its indicatorsÕ (IP 2013 p. 29). 
It was after this Panel report that the Doing Business team began seriously to 
question its own normative underpinnings. In 2015 the first more-than-superficial note 
of self-criticism finally emerged from within the Doing Business team. The vehicle 
was the remarkably reflective Doing Business Report 2015 subtitled ÔGoing Beyond 
EfficiencyÕ. That report states from the outset that the Ôoriginal Doing Business 
indicators focused mainly on measuring efficiencyÕ but, while efficiency continues to 
be Ôvery importantÕ, there is also a need to consider Ôregulatory qualityÕ (pp. 1-2). 
Credit for this insight is given to the 2013 Independent Panel, as well as policy 
makers and data users.  
The Doing Business Report 2016: Measuring regulatory quality and efficiency 
continued the reflexive tone and to emphasis ÔqualityÕ as a counter-balance to the 
historical emphasis on efficiency. It does this ostensibly on the grounds that Ônew 
data show that efficiency and quality go hand in handÕ (2016, p. 1). The latter, some 
might say commonsensical, point was, as in 2015, said to Ôreflect consultations over 
the years with World Bank Group staff, country governments, the private sector, and 
the 2013 Independent Panel on Doing BusinessÕ (Doing Business 2016 p. 1). 
And lo, the Doing Business Report 2016 explicitly shifts the primary source of 
indicator legitimacy away from the private sector and towards ÔsocietyÕ, of which the 
private sector was specifically re-branded as a mere sub-section:  
ÔSocieties need regulationÑand businesses, as part of society, are no 
exception. Without the rules that underpin their establishment, operation and 
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dissolution, modern businesses cannot exist. And where markets left to 
themselves would produce poor outcomes, well-designed regulation can 
ensure outcomes that are socially optimal and likely to leave everyone better 
offÕ (Doing Business Report 2016 p.1). 
The Report goes on to enumerate some of these Ôsocially optimalÕ outcomesÑ
hitherto entirely alien to the Doing Business regimeÑsuch as fairness, balancing of 
power, the provision of public goods and the tempering of wealth maximising instincts 
(Doing Business Report 2016 p.1). Most recently, Doing Business 2017: Equal 
Opportunity for All has introduced a measure for gender diversity.  
Shifting rationalities 
The shifts from private to public, commercial to social, that have been emphasized in 
the above sections are a reflection of wider trends within the World Bank and beyond 
(Perry-Kessaris 2014 and 2017). The BankÕs World Development Report of 2015 
acknowledges the role of rationalities in social, including economic life: 
ÔWhen people think, they generally do not draw on concepts that they have 
invented themselves. Instead, they use concepts, categories, identities, 
prototypes, stereotypes, causal narratives, and worldviews drawn from their 
communitiesÕ (World Bank 2015, p. 11). 
Indeed it emphasises that Ôdevelopment professionalsÕ themselves are subject to 
rationalities: they are Ôinfluenced by their social tendencies and social environmentsÕ 
(termed Ôsocial thinkingÕ) they Ôuse deeply ingrained mindsetsÕ including Ôdisciplinary, 
cultural, and ideological priorsÕ that render Ôthem susceptible to confirmation biasÕ 
(termed Ôthinking with mental modelsÕ); and they are Ôprone to error when decision-
making contexts are complexÕ (termed Ôautomatic thinkingÕ) (WDR 2015 p. 2 and 181-
2. Cited in Perry-Kessaris 2017). Likewise the World Development Report 2017: 
Governance and the Law focuses all its attention on the economic, social and 
political complexities of rule making and breaking. All of this sociologically-relevant 
awareness can be traced to the rising influence of experimental and behavioural 
economics across the BankÕs approach to development, a rise which coincided with 
the global rethinks provoked by the 2008 financial crisis.  
The Independent Evaluation GroupÕs initial co-constructing critique came in 2008, a 
most interesting of economic years (albeit since topped by 2016). During that period, 
even Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, was famously 
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confronted with his self-declared ÔideologyÕ that Ôfree, competitive markets are by far 
the unrivalled way to organise economies; and found himself confessing ÔI found a 
flawÉ in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines 
how the world works, so to speakÉI had been going for 40 years or more with the 
very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally wellÕ (Quoted in Patel 
2011, p.6). And Greenspan was not alone on his journey from universalizing model to 
fiddly, context-specific, reality. Many other economists have faced up to the 
disastrous consequences of their ÔomissionsÕ in relation to the 2008 financial crisis, 
and their ÔcommissionsÕ in the form of the universal prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus to Ôstabilize, privatise, liberalizeÕ (Rodrik 2015, p. 167).  
ÔDifferent contextsÑdifferent markets, social settings, countries, time periods, and so 
onÑrequire different modelsÕ (Rodrik 2015 p. 11). Consequently, when models are 
selected judiciously, they are a source of illumination. When used dogmatically, they 
lead to hubris and errors in policyÕ (Rodrik 2015, p. 11). All of this is no Ôalmost a 
mantra for development economists, finance experts and international agenciesÕ who 
chant that Ôno single set of policies is appropriate for all countriesÕ, so that Ôreforms 
must be tailored to specific circumstancesÕ. In this new context legitimacy comes not 
from following the standard but rather from choosing an appropriate standard for the 
circumstances (Rodrik 2015, p. 167).  
But the universalizing ranking system of the Doing Business regime works directly 
against the philosophy of context-specificity. It embosses both the standard (a legal 
system that has X features is ÔgoodÕ, and therefore legitimate) and the outcome (this 
country A is good/legitimate).  
Once we have seen this format of legitimacy/tion, we cannot un-see it. And every 
effort is made to see that we do see it. IndicatorsÑfrom World Development 
Indicators9 to Doing BusinessÑhave always occupied one of the most lavishly 
curated zones in the Bank web presence, signifying their senior status. But the Doing 
Business regime has a separate domain name, doingbusiness.org, implying that it 
inhabits another world entirely.10 And while another set of indicators produced by the 
                                                
9  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
10  Investment Climate surveys also have a separate domain name 
enterprisesurveys.org. These Ôrely on ÒsoftÓ as opposed to statistical data Ð that is, 
interviews with managers and business owners Ð and provide rich data sets.Õ 
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Bank, the enterprise surveys, also has a separate domain name, Ôthe surveys are 
only available on the BankÕs website and do not receive as much dedicated 
communications support as the Doing Business reportÕ (Independent Panel on Doing 
Business 2013, p. 10). Two of the institutional challenges to the Doing Business 
regime that will be explored in more detail below have paid close attention to the 
communication of the indicators. In 2008, the Independent Evaluation Group report 
included a section on ÔcommunicationsÕ which noted that ÔDoing Business stands out 
among Bank Group products for the variety and innovativeness of the 
communications tools it usesÕ and that the reports are Ôadmired for their simplicityÕ. 
However, Ôthis sometimes undermines rigorÕ (IEG 2008 pp. 41 and 42). Likewise the 
Independent Panel pointed out in 2013 that the Ôdescriptions of topics (indicators) 
contained in Doing Business are, like the title of the report itself, catchy and easy to 
remember. However, they often make the indicators sound more comprehensive than 
they are, given their well-defined (and therefore limited) scope of measurementÕ (IP 
2013, p. 30). 
Conclusion  
Even in the most concrete, physical, of spheres, the history of measurement is one of 
negotiation, faith and abstraction. And therefore indicators not neutral facilitators. The 
regimes and underlying rationalities in the context of which indicators are produced, 
distributed and consumed influence not only on our perceptions of the world, but also 
on how we perceive those perceptions.  
This article has explored the construction of the legitimacy the Doing Business 
indicators, and the resulting construction of the legitimacy of state legal systems 
through the Doing Business regime.11  Applying a sociologically-informed lens, it has 
shown how standards, and their legitimacy, are co-constructed by their producers 
and consumers across multiple, mutually constitutive, levels of social lifeÑfrom 
action and interaction to regimes and rationalities. It has emphasised that indicators 
offer at best a partial (in both senses of the word) snapshot of social life. If those 
snapshots are to contribute to knowledge, we need to look behind and beyond the 
Doing Business regime to the rationalities that guide it.  
                                                
11  In the context of the present collection, the Doing Business Indicators fall 
within the Ôgood governance and rule of lawÕ sub-category of Nelken and SiemsÕ 
typology of Ôglobal social indicatorsÕ. 
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Behind any standard lies an on-going negotiation. In the case of the Doing Business 
regime that negotiation first became visible outside Bank, then internal to Bank but 
external to the Doing Business team and finally within the Doing Business team itself. 
So a focus on the Doing Business indicators highlights tensions across the World 
Bank as an institution and across time. As such it sheds light on the construction of 
legitimacy across Ôlaw and developmentÕ or Ôlegal developmentÕ communities of 
practice.  
Governance indicators are not new and they did not start with the World Bank. The 
Bank was applauding (and later supporting) NGOs for issuing score cards ranking 
public services in Bengaluru and Pune as early as the mid 1990s (Perry 1998). What 
has changed is that they are being issued and responded to daily, and by the city 
itself. Recently the Governance Global Practice at the World Bank praised a scheme 
adopted by the city of Boston to use technology to collect, analyse and act upon data 
measuring the delivery of services such as pothole repair and waste collection, and 
calculating a daily Ôcity scoreÕ (PBS Newshour 2015, Lloyd 2015).12  
Although the Doing Business indicators cannot rightly be accused of prompting the 
universalising tendencies of economists, they certainly support and institutionalise 
those tendencies. It is especially significant that legal systems are themselves setters 
of standards, makers of legitimacy. So whatever reforms are made to legal systems 
in order to pose for, or doctor, the snapshot produced by the Doing Business regime 
will have a long-term social effects. What remains to be seen is whether early 
understandings of legitimacy under the Doing Business regime will continue to exist 
as ÔlegacyÕ standardsÑovertaken by developments but still in wide circulation. 
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 Figure 1: The contingency of standards13  
  
                                                










Figure 2: Constructing an indicator14 
 
                                                
14  Stills from A. Perry-Kessaris (2016) ÔSociolegal model making 3: 
ConceptualisationÕ. Video.  
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Figure 3: A snapshot of Cyprus Source: Doing Business 2016. 
Source: http://doingbusiness.org 
 
